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Abstract 
That the mind performs inferences is pretty much beyond doubt. 
That some of these inferences are logical inferences is also quite 
uncontroversial. Peirce, however, presents a fascinatingly plausible thesis 
to the effect that the only operation that the mind performs is logical 
inference. In this thesis I explicate what this single type of inference is. 
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It was Peirce's explicit intention to reduce all operations of the 
mind to a single type of operation, that of logical inference. 
In other words, we must, as far as we can do so without additional 
hypotheses, reduce all kinds of mental action to one general type. 
( ... ] We must, as far as we can, without any other supposition than 
that the mind reasons, reduce all mental action to the formula of 
valid reasoning.1 
In this thesis I will present a novel interpretation of Peirce's philosophy 
that explicates what this single type of inference is. 
Before I explain how I will fulfill this aim I need to introduce and 
define inference, and provide a criterion with which to distinguish two 
distinct types of inference. To these ends I will articulate Descartes' 
theory of inference and Hume's theory of inference. To define what an 
inference is I will examine two similarities between these inferences. To 
provide a criterion with which to distinguish two distinct types of 
inference I will extricate a difference between these inferences . 
1 Edward C. Moore, ed. Max H. Fisch, consult. ed. Christian J. W. 
Kloesel, snr. assoc. ed. Don D. Roberts, assoc. ed. Lynn A . Zeigler, 
textual ed. Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume Two 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982 -) p 220, c.1868. 
1 
1) Descartes' inference. 
Insofar as inference for Descartes is reducible to intuition, I will 
begin by explaining intuition. 2 First, intuition is carried out by the attentive 
mind. Here we can consider this text of Descartes' and the editors' 
footnote inserted on the word 'intuit': 
Concerning objects proposed for study, we ought to investigate 
what we can clearly and evidently intuit or deduce with certainty, 
and not what other people have thought or what we ourselves 
conjecture. For knowledge can be attained in no other way ~talics 
removed]. 3 
And the relevant footnote is: "[Intuit] Lat. Intueri, literally 'to look, gaze 
at'; used by Descartes as a technical term for immediate mental 
apprehension."4 More evidence that intuition is carried out by the 
attentive mind is presented in Rule three: "Intuition is the indubitable 
conception of a clear and attentive mind which proceeds solely from the 
light of reason." 5 
Second, intuition is indubitable in two distinct senses. Intuition is 
indubitable in the sense that the person who has perceived the intuition 
cannot disbelieve it. 
By 'intuition' I do not mean the fluctuating testimony of the 
senses or the deceptive judgment of the imagination as it botches 
2 With respect to intuition Peter Schouls has argued the position 
that I will advocate here. "For Locke as for Descartes, it is only from the 
foundation of these fully known contextless items that theorizing can 
start, that systematic ('general') knowledge can be achieved." Peter A. 
Schouls, Reasoned Freedom: John Locke and Enlightenment. (Cornell University 
Press, 1992), p 21. 
3 Rene Descartes . "Rules for the Direction of the Mind" in John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, trans . The Philosophical 
Writings of DESCARTES: Volume One. (Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
Hereafter referred to as Rules. AT X, 366, p 13. 
4 Rules, AT X, 366, p 13. 
5 Rules, AT X, 368, p 14. 
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things together, but the conception of a clear and attentive mind, 
which is so easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt 
about what we are understanding.6 
And intuition is indubitable in the sense that intuitions are actually true: 
"These simple natures [intuited] are all self-evident and never contain any 
falsity." 7 
The final aspect of intuition that I will note is that it plays two 
roles in inferences for Descartes. Before I do this I will discuss two terms 
of art that I will use throughout the thesis that deserve some comment. 
The first is the term relata. By the term relata I mean 'relate', which is 
defined as: "Logic. One of two objects of thought between which a 
relation subsists."8 I cannot use the term 'relate' because I need both the 
singular and the plural, yet I also use the term 'relates' in the sense 'x 
relates y to z'. To avoid confusion I will use the term 'relata' for the plural 
of relate, and the term 'relatum' for the singular of relate. 9 The second 
term deserving of comment is 'connexion'. Since the term 'relation' refers 
to both the link that relates the relata and the linked 'relata-relation-relata' 
complex, I will use the term 'connexion' to refer to the link, and reserve 
the term 'relation' for the complex. 
The two roles that intuition plays in Descartes' theory of inference 
are, first, it provides the relata of inference, and second, it provides the 
connexion whereby the relata are logically related. 
Secondly, those things which are said to be simple with respect to 
our intellect are, on our view, either purely intellectual or purely 
material, or common to both. Those simple natures which the 
6 &des, AT X, 368, p 14. 
7 Rules, AT X, 420, p 45. 
8 Revised and edited by C. T. Onions, The Shorter Oxford Dictionary 
On Historical Principles (Clarendon Press, 19 50) p 1694. 
9 I would like to than Dr. S.E. Lawrence for clarifying to me the 
usage of these Latin terms. 
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intellect recognizes by means of a sort of innate light, without the 
aid of any corporeal image, are purely intellectual. [ ... ] Those 
simple natures, on the other hand, which are recognized to be 
present only in bodies - such as shape, extension and motion, etc. 
-are purely material. Lastly, those simples are to be termed 
'common' which are ascribed indifferently, now to corporeal 
things, now to spirits -for instance, existence, unity, duration, and 
the like. To this class we must also refer those common notions which are, as 
it were, links which connect other simple natures together, and whose se!f 
evidence is the basis for all the rational inferences we make [italics mine]. 10 
One further concept is needed before articulating Descartes' 
theory of inference. I need to explain the concept of 'clear and distinct 
ideas'. All indubitable ideas, either because they are simple intuitions, or 
because they are logically related clusters of simple intuitions are clear and 
distinct ideas. 
It is certain, however, that we will never mistake the false for the 
true provided we give our assent only to what we clearly and 
distinctly perceive. 11 
Inference for Descartes is the relating of ideas by intuition, where 
the ideas being related are all clear and distinct. To avoid confusion I need 
to explicate the distinction Descartes' draws between inference and 
deduction. The difference being that deduction consists of more than one 
inference: 
There may be some doubt here about our reason for suggesting 
another mode of knowing in addition to intuition, viz. deduction 
[ .. .]. But this distinction had to be made, since very many facts 
which are not self-evident are known with certainty, provided they 
are inferred from true and known principles through a continuous 
and uninterrupted movement of thought in which each individual 
proposition is clearly intuited. This is similar to the way in which 
10 Rules, AT X, 419, p 44. 
11 Rene Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy", in John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, trans. The 
Philosophical Writings of DESCARTES: Volume One. (Cambridge University 
Press, 1985). AT VIIIA, 21, p 207. 
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we know that the last link in a long chain is connected to the first: 
even if we cannot take in at one glance all the intermediate links 
on which the connection depends, we can have knowledge of the 
connection provided we survey the links one after the other, and 
keep in mind that each link from first to last is attached to its 
neighbour. Hence we are distinguishing mental intuition from 
certain deduction on the grounds that we are aware of a 
movement or a sort of sequence in the latter but not in the 
former. 12 
Thus, all inference, for Descartes, contams two elements, clear 
and distinct ideas as relata, and intuition of the logical connexion between 
the relata. And we can further note that the requirement is strict: 
But, whenever even the smallest link is overlooked the chain is 
immediately broken, and the certainty of the conclusion entirely 
1· collapses. ' 
And again: 
If in the series of things to be examined we come across 
something which our intellect is unable to intuit sufficiently well, 
we must stop at that point, and refrain from the superfluous task 
of examining the remaining items [italics removed].
14 
2) Hume's causal inference. 
Hume propounds a theory of inference that differs from 
Descartes'. Specifically, whereas the relating of the relata in Descartes' 
inference is carried out by the attentive mind's ability to intuit, the 
attenove mind plays no role in cognizing the connexion between the 
relata in Hume's causal inference. I will explicate Hume's theory of 
inference by substantiating this claim. 
12 Rules, AT X, 369, p 15. 
13 Rules, AT X, 388, p 25. 
14 Rules, AT X, 392, p 28. 
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For Hume, all ideas are derived from impressions. Our idea of 
causation too, is derived from an impression. 
To begin regularly, we must consider the idea of causation, and see 
from what origin it is deriv'd. 'Tis impossible to reason justly, 
without understanding perfectly the idea concerning which we 
reason; and 'tis impossible perfectly to understand any idea, 
without tracing it up to its origin, and examining that primary 
impression, from which it arises. i; 
By examining Hume's quest for the impression responsible for the idea of 
causation we find that Hume proposes a type of inference where the 
attentive mind is not responsible for perceiving the connexion between 
the relata. 
Hume first discovers that the idea of causation is not copied from 
an impression derived from the objects deemed to belong in causal 
relations.16 He next examines the connexion between the objects deemed 
to belong in causal relations, but in this connexion he discovers only 
contiguity and succession. 17 Nor, Hume claims, are contiguity and 
succession sufficient explanations for our idea of causation but "there is a 
NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that 
relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above-
mention'd [contiguity and succession]."
18 
Here again I turn the object on all sides, in order to discover the 
nature o f this necessary connexion, and find the impression, or 
impressions, from which its idea may be deriv'd. When I cast my 
eye on the known qualities of objects, I immediately discover the 
i; L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed, P. H. Nidditch, rev. second edition. David 
Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature. (Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1978) Hereafter 
referred to as Treatise. 1, 3, 2, p 74. 
16 Treatise, 1, 3, 2, p 75. 
17 Treatise, 1, 3, 2, p 75. 
18 Treatise, 1, 3, 2, p 77. 
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relation of cause and effect depends not in the least upon them. 
When I consider their relations, I can find none but those of 
contiguity and succession; which I have already regarded as 
. C d · f 19 1mper1ect an unsatls actory. 
Lamenting this inability to discover the impression responsible for 
our idea of causation, Hume approaches the task from a different angle. 
He asks: "Why we conclude, that such particular causes must necessarily 
have such particular effects, and why we form an inference from one to 
another? [italics removed]" 20 
To this question Hume answers: The inferences we form from 
'cause' to 'effect' are customs embedded in the mind. These customs are 
established because the mind is immersed in experience, and this 
experience contains objects that are constantly conjoined. Essentially, we 
become accustomed to expect that a certain type of object be followed by 
another type of object because it has always done so in experience. This 
expectation is the causal inference. 
We have no other notion of cause and effect, but that of certain 
objects, which have been always conjoin'd together, and which in all 
past instances have been found inseparable. We cannot penetrate 
into the reason of the conjunction. We only observe the thing 
itself, and always find that from the constant conjunction the 
objects acquire an union in the imagination. When the impression 
of one becomes present to us, we immediately form an idea of its 
usual attendant.21 
The inference, it must be stressed, is the blind compulsion of the 
mind, such that when it is aware of one idea its usual attendant 1s 
inexplicably, and almost inexorably, brought to consciousness also. 
19 Treatise, 1, 3, 2, p 77. 
20 Treatise, 1, 3, 4, p 82. 
21 Treatise, 1, 3, 6, p 93. 
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First, We have already observ'd, that the mind is determin'd by 
custom to pass from any cause to its effect, and that upon the 
appearance of the one, 'tis almost impossible for it not to form the 
idea of the other. Their constant conjunction in past instances has 
produc'd such a habit in the mind, that it always conjoins them in 
its thought, and infers the existence of the one from that of its 
usual attendant.22 
Hume claims that the impression responsible for our idea of 
causation is the causal inferences that we make as these create an 
impression upon the mind. 23 
There is, then, nothing new either discover'd or produc'd in any 
objects by their constant conjunction, and by the uninterrupted 
resemblance of their relations of succession and contiguity. But 
'tis from this resemblance, that the ideas of necessity, of power, 
and of efficacy are deri\·'d. [ ... ] Tho' the several resembling 
instances, which give rise to the idea of power, have no influence 
on each other, and can never produce any new quality in the object, 
which can be the model of that idea, yet the observation of this 
resemblance produces a new impression in the mind, which is its 
real model. 24 
Examining Hume's quest to find an impression from which our 
idea of causation is derived thus illustrates that an attentive mind is not 
involved in perceiving the connexion between ideas in Humean causal 
inferences. Rather, reflecting upon the causal inferences we make 1s 
responsible for the impression from which our idea of causation 1s 
derived. These causal inferences are customs where the mind blindly yet 
22 Treatise, 1, 3, 11 , p 128. 
23 "From a second observation I conclude, that the belief, which attends 
the present impression, and is produc'd by a number of past impressions and 
conjunctions; that this belief, I say, arises immediately, without any new 
operation of the reason or imagination. Of this I can be certain, because I never 
am conscious of any operation, and find nothing in the subject, on which it can 
be founded." Treatise, 1, 3, 8, p 102. 
24 Treatise, 1, 3, 14, p 164. 
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consistently associates the ideas of objects constantly conjoined in 
expenence. 
3) Inference defined. 
By extricating two similarities between Descartes' theory of 
inference and Hume's theory of inference I will now present two aspects 
of inference that I will incorporate into a definition of inference. The first 
similarity is that inference for both Descartes and Hume consists of and a 
connexion that relates the relata into a relation. 25 For Descartes the relata 
are always clear and distinct ideas, and the connexion is an intuition 
apprehended by the attentive mind. For Hume, the relata are objects 
and/ or ideas. The connexion, which enables the mind to perceive one 
relatum and associate it with its effect or cause, is a habit that is embedded 
in the mind. 
The second similarity between Descartes', and Hume's theories of 
inference, is that the connexion which relates the relata depends upon the 
mind. That is, without mind there is no connexion and no inference. With 
respect to Descartes I have shown that all intuition is carried out by the 
attentive mind. Since the connexion relating the relata in inference is 
intuition for Descartes, it follows that without mind there is no intuition, 
therefore there is no connexion relating the relata , and no inferences. 
With respect to Hume, even though the attentive mind plays no 
role in perceiving the connexion between the relata in causal inferences 
the connexion still depends upon the mind. The constant conjunction of 
objects in experience is sensation. It is only when the mind appropriates 
the relation between constantly conjoining objects in the form of a habit, 
and uses that habit to form inferences, that causal inference differs from 
sensanon. 
25 It is uncontroversial that all relata when related form a relation. 
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Were there no mixture of any unpression in our probable 
reasonings, the conclusion wou'd be entirely chimerical: And were 
there no mixture of ideas, the action of the mind, in observing the 
relation, wou'd, properly speaking, be sensation, not reasoning. 
'Tis therefore necessary, that in all probable reasonings there be 
something present to the mind, either seen or remember'd; and 
that from this we infer something connected with it, which is not 
seen nor remember'd. 26 
Again, without the mind there are no causal inferences for Hume because 
the connexion relating the relata is a habit embedded in the mind. 
I am now in a position to define how I will use the term 
'inference' throughout this thesis. An inference consists of relata, and a 
connexion that relates the relata, where the connexion depends upon the 
mind such that were there no mind there would be no connexion and no 
inference. I will also state at this juncture that for the purpose of this 
thesis I take it to be beyond doubt that there are inferences, and by 
definition therefore, the mind performs inferences. 
4) Two types of inference. 
In this section I will examine a difference between Descartes' and 
Hume's theories of inference and extricate a criterion with which we can 
distinguish two distinct types of inference. I have already introduced this 
difference when I introduced Hume's causal inference. The difference is 
that the attentive mind perceives the connexion between the relata in 
Descartes' theory of inference, whereas the attentive mind plays no role in 
perce1vmg the connexion between the relata in Hume's theory of 
inference. 
Given that every inference consists of relata and a connexion that 
relates the relata, it is logically possible to distinguish two types of 
inference. In one type of inference, as instantiated by Descartes' inference, 
16 Treatise, 1, 3, 6, p 89. 
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the attentive mind perceives the connexion that relates the relata. This 
type of inference I will term Cartesian type inference. In the other type of 
inference, instantiated by Hume's casual inference, the attentive mind is 
not involved in perceiving the connexion that relates the relata. This type 
of inference I will term Humean rype inference. Humean type inference, to be 
clear about it, still requires that the mind cognizes the connexion that 
relates the relata, only, it is not the attentive mind that does the cognizing. 
This distinction has universal applicability, as there is no inference 
which cannot be classed as either a Cartesian or a Humean type inference. 
That is, it is logically possible for an inference to be either a Cartesian or a 
Humean type inference. It is logically impossible for an inference to be 
both a Cartesian and a Humean type inference. It is also, given the above 
definition of inference, logically impossible for an inference to be neither 
a Cartesian or a Humean type inference. 
5) Introducing Peirce. 
Now that I have defined inference and explicated the distinction 
between Cartesian and Humean type inference, I am in a position to 
comprehensively introduce Peirce. I have already shown that Peirce 
explicitly intended to reduce all operations of the mind to a single type of 
inference.27 I have also stated that my aim in this thesis is to present a 
novel interpretation of Peirce's philosophy that explicates what this single 
type of inference is. I will now explain how I intend to accomplish this 
aun. 
27 We find this intention restated in MS 339: "It is necessary to 
reduce all our actions to logical processes so that to do anything is but to 
take another step in the chain of inference. Thus only can we effect that 
complete reciprocity between Thought & its Object which it was Kant's 
Copernican step to announce." (MS 339) in Max H . Fisch, 'Chronical of 
Pragmatism, 1865 - 1879', in Kenneth Laine Ketner, Christian J. W. 
Kloesel, ed, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragamatism: Essqys try Max H. Fisch 
(Indiana University Press, 1986). Hereafter referred to as Ketner, p 116. 
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The interpretation of Peirce that I present in this thesis is dictated 
by the need to understand Peirce's theory of inference as either a 
Cartesian or a Humean type inference. For if Peirce is to succeed in 
reducing all operations of the mind to a single type of inference then this 
inference must be either a Cartesian or a Humean type inference. As I 
have already shown, every inference is classifiable as either a Cartesian 
type inference or a Humean type inference. I will argue that Peirce 
maintains that the mind performs only Humean type inference. 
This is not to say that understanding what a Humean type 
inference is means that one understands the single type of inference that 
Peirce posits. Rather, it is to say that understanding what a Humean type 
inference is means that one understands an important aspect of Peirce's 
theory of inference. It is by substantiating the claim that Peirce reduces all 
operations of the mind to a Humean type inference that I will 
concurrently present a novel interpretation of Peirce that comprehensively 
explains what Peirce's inference is. Or to state the position in terms of 
analogies, by arguing that Peirce reduces all operations of the mind to 
Humean type inference I have a single thread running through this thesis, 
around which I can develop a comprehensive explanation of the single 
type of inference that Peirce posits. 
The structure of the thesis from here on is as follows. In the 
second chapter I will introduce Peirce's philosophy by explaining 
semiosis. 28 I will thereby introduce the single type of inference that Peirce 
advocates. In the third chapter I will examine the elements of this single 
28 With respect to terminology, Fisch has noted that: "For 
[Greek symbols]- the art or science or doctrine or general theory of 
semioses -he uses semeiotic; much less often, semeiotics or semiotic." Max H . 
Fisch, Peirce's General Theory ef Signs, in Ketner, f 322. Yet contemporary 
commentators on Peirce vary in their spelling o the terms 'semiosis', and 
'semiotic'. I will follow Hooh-way who uses the immediately preceding 
spelling. See Christopher Hooh-way, Peirce (Routledge & Kegan PauI, 
1985). 
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type of inference, and thereby explicate what this single type of inference 
is. In the conclusion I will demonstrate that the single type of inference 
presented in the thesis is a Humean type inference. 
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